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Credit Ratings and Acquisitions 
 
Abstract 
 
We document a curvilinear relation between credit ratings and acquisitions.  Acquisitions first increase 
and then decrease as ratings improve, with a high around the A− threshold.  The increase at low rating 
levels is accompanied by lower announcement returns.  Acquisitions have a negative impact on future 
ratings for highly-rated firms, and a positive impact for firms with low ratings, even after controlling for 
all the characteristics potentially influenced by the transaction.  These results indicate that credit ratings 
exert substantial influence on the acquisition process, and that rating agencies pay particular attention 
to acquisitions when deciding on the creditworthiness of firms. 
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1.  Introduction 
Credit rating agencies play an important role in global markets by evaluating the credit quality of 
debt issuers and reducing the information asymmetry between firms and investors, thereby allowing 
rated firms to access the public debt market more easily.  In fact, the lack of a rating is employed in a 
number of articles as a proxy for financial constraints (see, for example, Whited, 1992; Almeida, 
Campello, and Weisbach, 2004; Faulkender and Petersen, 2006; Denis and Sibilkov, 2010).  In support of 
this view, Harford and Uysal (2014) show that being rated indeed relaxes financing constraints and has a 
real effect on acquisition decisions.1 
Even among rated firms, however, there are several channels through which the rating level could 
influence acquisition behavior and associated returns, but these channels have not been studied in the 
literature.  In this paper, we remedy this deficiency by conducting an in-depth investigation of the role of 
rating agencies in the acquisitions process.  In particular, we examine whether the level of the rating and 
previous rating changes affect acquisition activity and associated stock returns; we also study the impact 
of merger activity on subsequent rating changes.  Understanding acquisition decisions and related wealth 
creation is of first order importance, given the tremendous reallocation of resources in these 
transactions.  For example, U.S. firms alone spent $2 trillion on acquisitions during 2014.  Moreover, 
given that ratings have a material impact on the cost of debt, understanding how ratings are affected by 
acquisition decisions is also of primary importance. 
 There are many reasons why ratings could influence the acquisition process. First, as discussed 
above, rated firms are less likely to be capital constrained, providing them with more opportunities to 
exhaust their investment opportunity set.  Acquisitions are but one of these potential investments.  
Nevertheless, even if a firm has obtained a rating, cross-sectional and time-series differences in the level 
of the rating are likely to also influence acquisition decisions.  Firms with low, non-investment-grade 
                                                          
1
 See also Sufi (2009), who examines the introduction of syndicated bank loan ratings by Moody’s and S&P and finds 
that rated firms increase debt, asset growth, and cash acquisitions. 
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ratings are still likely to be capital constrained (see, for example, Campello, Graham, and Harvey, 2010), 
preventing them from making all potential acquisitions, especially when they are cash financed.  As 
ratings improve, constraints are likely to weaken and we would expect these firms to engage in more 
acquisition activities as a result.  Once ratings reach a certain threshold, however, additional 
improvements in ratings are less likely to alleviate financial constraints any further, which would abate or 
eliminate the effect of additional rating increases on acquisition decisions. 
 Second, rating agencies also serve as monitors, a role emphasized by Boot, Milbourn, and Schmeits 
(2006), among others.  Firms that make decisions that increase the likelihood of default or decrease 
recovery given default will face a greater risk of being downgraded, leading to higher debt costs, and a 
negative stock price reaction upon the downgrade (see Hand, Holthausen, and Leftwich, 1992).  This is 
exactly what previous research finds for acquisitions: leverage and the associated default risk increase, on 
average, following acquisitions (see, for example, Billett, King, and Mauer, 2004; Furfine and Rosen, 
2011).2  These are likely accompanied with credit rating downgrades.  Such downgrades need not be 
avoided, however, if the acquisition is value-creating for shareholders and if the rating is simply a 
reflection of increased credit risk.  Yet, prior work suggests that firms do avoid taking on additional 
leverage if this would lead to a downgrade or would prevent them from being upgraded (see Kisgen, 
2006).  Such considerations could also apply to acquisitions.  Of course, these arguments alone do not 
imply a relation between rating levels and acquisition activity as they apply to all firms at all ratings 
thresholds.  However, the increased cost in debt associated with a downgrade is most salient around the 
investment grade threshold and is not always related to actual changes in credit quality.  Chernenko and 
Sunderam (2012), for example, argue that there are discrete changes in the label from investment to 
non-investment grade, unrelated to continuous measures of default risk, and they report that these 
                                                          
2
 According to a recent Standard & Poor’s (S&P) study by Arden and McGovern (2013), circa half of the U.S. 
companies rated by S&P that had completed major acquisitions (transaction values of more than $5 billion) since 
2000 had a lower rating by 2013.  Among the factors explaining the decrease in rating, the authors emphasize the 
overestimation of synergies, failure in post-merger integration, and increase in leverage. 
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changes affect a firm’s investment decisions.  In related work, Chen, Lookman, Schurhoff, and Seppi 
(2014) find that when a series of non-investment grade bonds were mechanically relabeled investment 
grade as a result of a Lehman Brothers index redefinition, yields on these bonds declined by 21 basis 
points.  Thus, if mergers put downward pressure on ratings, we would expect firms around the non-
investment grade cutoff in particular to reduce their acquisition frequency. 
Third, firms and their managers may also derive other benefits from having higher ratings.  Higher 
ratings may improve contracting with customers and other parties, and open up or improve access to the 
commercial paper market.  Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan (2012), for example, show that the most 
creditworthy buyers receive trade contracts with the longest maturities.3  In addition, managers may also 
derive utility from having a higher rating per se.  Graham and Harvey (2001) report that managers are 
particularly worried about their credit rating when deciding on the level of debt.  While it is not clear that 
the credit rating, by itself, should carry substantial weight in capital structure decisions after controlling 
for all variables related to credit ratings, such as bankruptcy costs and the volatility of earnings, Graham 
and Harvey (2001) find that it does.  If a firm’s decision making is aimed at maintaining the current rating 
− whatever the forces are that have led the firm to adopt that particular rating as the ideal one − then 
firms may well refrain from taking any action that could jeopardize their rating.  This could be particularly 
relevant at higher rating levels as there is evidence that rating changes are much more sensitive to 
changes in perceived default risk for firms at the top end of the ratings spectrum; in particular, the work 
by Altman (1998), Lando and Skødeberg (2002), and Standard & Poor’s (2013) shows that the rating 
migration probabilities and the likelihood of a downgrade are higher for firms with higher credit ratings 
than for those with low ratings.  These arguments combined imply that firms reduce their acquisition 
likelihood as ratings improve and that this effect is particularly germane at the highest rating levels. 
                                                          
3
 See Kisgen (2006) for a discussion of the relation between commercial paper access and credit ratings and 
Standard and Poor’s (2008) for a discussion of other contracting benefits associated with higher ratings. 
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Finally, high ratings could just be a reflection of overly conservative management willing to forego 
acquisition opportunities, even if they are deemed value increasing because there is too much downside 
risk.  In fact, Standard and Poor’s recognizes this possibility when discussing their ratings criteria.  They 
argue that: “[…] managing for a very high rating can sometimes be inconsistent with the company’s 
ultimate best interests, if it means being overly conservative and forgoing opportunities.” (Standard and 
Poor’s, 2008, p. 36). 
We investigate these arguments using a sample of 2,230 U.S. firms with a credit rating over the 
period from 1989 to 2011 (20,488 firm-year observations) that conducted 4,772 acquisitions from 1990 
to 2012.  We report several novel results on the role of ratings in the acquisition process.  The relation 
between credit ratings and acquisitiveness that we discover is broadly curvilinear, where acquisition 
likelihood first increases and then decreases as ratings improve.  Firms with a rating around the A minus 
level are the most acquisitive.  The only rating levels where the upward sloping part of the relation 
between ratings and acquisitions is disrupted, is around the investment-grade threshold where firms 
refrain from making more acquisitions as ratings increase.  These patterns are broadly consistent with the 
arguments made above.  Consistent with the financial constraints argument, at low levels of debt ratings, 
below the BB+ level, the likelihood of making an acquisition and the amount spent on acquisitions both 
increase as debt ratings improve.  At ratings of BB+, the highest non-investment grade rating, and BBB−, 
the lowest investment grade rating, there are no further increases in the likelihood of doing a deal, and, 
in fact, there is some evidence of a decline in transactions.  This result supports the view that around the 
investment/non-investment grade threshold, firms become particularly reluctant to take actions that 
might lead to a downgrade or jeopardize a possible upgrade. 
Additional modest increases in acquisition activity beyond a BBB− rating up to a rating of about A− 
are consistent with a further relaxation of financial constraints at higher rating levels.  The negative 
relation between acquisitiveness and ratings beyond the A− threshold, on the other hand, supports the 
view that managers with high ratings are reluctant to take any action that can jeopardize the rating and 
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that this aversion becomes stronger as ratings increase.  This evidence suggests that managers attach 
value to specific debt ratings per se, with higher valuations attached to higher ratings.   
To explore our interpretation of the results in more detail, we conduct several additional tests.  
First, we show that these findings hold after controlling for a number of factors related to default risk, 
such as leverage and cash holdings.  In fact, even after controlling for distance to default, our findings 
persist.  Thus, ratings have an independent impact on acquisition likelihood. In addition, we repeat our 
analysis for subsamples of cash and stock acquisitions.  The results for cash acquisitions parallel our main 
findings, and are consistent with the financial constraints argument at low rating levels.  For stock-
financed acquisitions by firms with low ratings, there is no evidence of an increase in acquisitions as 
ratings improve, suggesting that constraints only bind when firms fund the acquisition with cash.  For 
highly-rated firms, the relation between acquisitions and ratings is negative for both cash and stock 
acquisitions.  Thus, highly-rated firms reduce their acquisitiveness in general as their rating increases, 
irrespective of the payment method, consistent with a strong aversion to possible downgrades. 
Second, we demonstrate that lagged rating actions also affect acquisition decisions.  Prior research 
documents momentum in ratings, such that a downgrade tends to be followed by another one (see, for 
example, Altman and Kao, 1992; Lando and Skødeberg, 2002).  Firms take this phenomenon into account 
and adjust their acquisitions downwards if they have recently been downgraded, even after controlling 
for current ratings.  The impact of past downgrades appears similar across rating categories, but given 
that highly-rated firms are less acquisitive, the effect of past rating actions is relatively larger for firms 
with higher ratings.  With regards to past upgrades, there is no significant impact on acquisition decisions. 
Third, we study whether the announcement effect associated with acquisitions is consistent with 
the financial constraints story for firms below the investment grade threshold and find this to be the case.  
Acquirer returns decline by 38 basis points for every notch increase in ratings as ratings increase from 
their lowest levels until close to the investment grade threshold, suggesting that improvements in ratings 
allow firms to further exhaust their acquisition opportunity set.  Beyond this cutoff, though, there are no 
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additional reductions in returns, which implies that the financial constraints argument cannot explain 
acquisition levels for investment grade firms.  There is also no evidence of a positive relation between 
returns and ratings for higher-rated firms.  Thus, while firms with high ratings reduce their 
acquisitiveness, they appear unable to select those acquisitions that yield the highest shareholder 
returns. 
Fourth, we explore whether mergers indeed put pressure on debt ratings.  We start by 
documenting that highly-rated firms are more likely to be downgraded after making acquisitions than 
otherwise, consistent with their reluctance to make acquisitions.  For firms with low ratings, on the other 
hand, the results are reversed: acquisitions are more likely to be associated with future upgrades.  These 
findings continue to hold after controlling for all other financial characteristics, including those that may 
have changed due to the acquisition, such as leverage and risk.  They also hold after controlling for prior 
stock price performance, and the stock returns associated with the acquisition announcements.  Thus, 
acquisitions receive particular scrutiny from rating agencies, beyond their immediate impact on the firm’s 
stock price or solvency ratios. 
This paper makes contributions to the literature on the determinants of mergers and acquisitions 
(M&A), the monitoring role of rating agencies, and the importance of credit frictions, in general.  The 
M&A literature posits many reasons for doing deals, which can be broadly classified into four groups: (a) 
improved efficiency (see, for example, Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2002; Maksimovic and Philips, 2001); (b) 
agency costs on the part of the target and/or empire-building and hubris on the part of the acquirer, 
(Manne, 1965; Jensen, 1986; Roll, 1986); (c) misvaluation of targets and/or acquirers (Bradley, Desai, and 
Kim, 1983; Shleifer and Vishny, 2003); (d) expropriation of other parties such as debtholders and 
employees (see, for instance, Shleifer and Summers, 1988).  Several authors have argued that these 
elements only trigger acquisitions when overall capital liquidity and liquidity in the market for specific 
corporate assets is sufficiently high (Schlingemann, Stulz, and Walkling, 2002; Harford, 2005).  After 
controlling for these effects, our paper illustrates that a firm’s credit rating has an independent impact on 
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the acquisitiveness of corporations and that this impact depends on where firms are located on the 
ratings scale. 
We also provide additional evidence on the monitoring role of credit rating agencies and the 
determinants of ratings by showing that merger activity has a negative influence on ratings for firms with 
the lowest default risk and a positive influence on firms with the highest default risk, regardless of how 
the acquisition was received by the stock market. 
In addition, we add to the growing literature showing the real effects of ratings on corporate 
decisions.  Kisgen (2006, 2009), Jung, Soderstrom, and Yang (2013), Alissa, Bonsall, Koharki, and Penn 
(2013) and Begley (2015) all demonstrate that firms are concerned about their credit rating levels and 
adjust their corporate policies to attain or maintain specific rating targets.  We show that concerns about 
rating downgrades may lead firms with high investment grade ratings to refrain from making acquisitions. 
Finally, at the lower end of the rating scale, our evidence is related to the literature that 
investigates how credit supply frictions affect corporate investment (see, for example, Lemmon and 
Roberts, 2010; Chernenko and Sunderam, 2012; Becker and Ivashina, 2014; Harford and Uysal, 2014).  
Closest to our work is Harford and Uysal (2014), who compare the acquisition behavior of rated versus 
unrated firms.  They find that rated firms are more likely to make acquisitions, and their announcement 
returns, while positive, are lower than those of unrated firms, which indicates that rated firms can further 
deplete their investment opportunities compared to unrated firms.  Our evidence suggests that even 
within the subset of rated firms, there is still substantial cross-sectional variation in acquisition behavior.  
In particular, we find that firms with lower non-investment grade ratings make fewer and more valuable 
acquisitions than similar non-investment grade firms with a higher rating.  In addition, we show that the 
relation between ratings and acquisitiveness is reversed for highly-rated firms. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 describes our sample selection 
procedure and presents summary statistics.  Section 3 is devoted to the empirical analyses of the impact 
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of rating levels on firm acquisitiveness and associated stock returns.  Section 4 reports results on the 
effect of past acquisitions on the acquirer’s credit rating.  Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2.  Sample description  
We start with all U.S. listed firms covered by Compustat that have a Standard and Poor’s credit 
rating available in any given year over the period 1989 to 2011.  Following previous studies (see, for 
example, Hovakimian, Opler and Titman, 2001; Harford and Uysal, 2014), we exclude financial firms (SIC 
codes 6000-6999) and regulated utilities (SIC codes 4900-4999) from our sample.  Firms with a rating of D 
(default) or SD (selective default) are also excluded from our analysis as in Alissa, Bonsall, Koharki, and 
Penn (2013) and Alp (2013).  Our sample includes 2,230 unique firms for a total of 20,488 firm/year 
observations.  
For each firm in the sample, we obtain all the completed transactions listed in the Thomson 
Financial SDC Mergers and Acquisitions Database as a merger, acquisition of majority interest, asset 
acquisition or acquisition of certain assets over the period 1990 to 2012.  Thus, while the acquirers in our 
sample are public firms, the targets can be public, private, or subsidiaries of other firms.  There is a one-
year lag between the sample period of the credit rating sample and the M&A sample because we relate 
acquisition activity in a specific year to the firm’s credit rating at the end of the previous year.  We also 
require deals to have a non-missing transaction value.  To focus on control transactions and to exclude 
acquisitions of a partial or remaining interest in the target, we require that the acquirer owns less than 
50% of target shares before the announcement and seeks to own more than 90% after the acquisition is 
completed.  Furthermore, to make sure that the sample includes only meaningful transactions from the 
acquirer’s perspective, we limit the sample to deals with transaction values over $1 million and in excess 
of 1% of the market value of the acquirer’s equity at the end of the month before the acquisition is 
announced.  Applying these restrictions yields a sample of 4,772 acquisitions.  These transactions are 
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conducted by 1,226 of the 2,230 rated firms in our sample.  The remaining 1,004 firms do not make any 
meaningful acquisitions over the sample period. 
Table 1 provides an overview of the sample; each firm-year is one observation.  The majority of the 
firms in our sample have a rating between BB– and BBB+ (54%), 23% of the firms have a rating between 
A– and AA+, 22% below BB–, and only 1.6% of our sample firms have a AAA rating.  Almost half of the 
firms in the sample do not attain an investment grade rating (BBB− or above).  This rating distribution is 
consistent with the prior literature (see, for example, Baghai, Servaes, and Tamayo, 2014).  Average firm 
size, measured as the book value of total assets in constant 2000 dollars declines as ratings worsen up to 
the B+ category after which there is a small increase.  Column (4) reports on the number of acquisitions 
made by the firms and column (5) presents the average size of the deals in constant 2000 dollars.  Firms 
with the highest and lowest ratings appear to be the least acquisitive, but the AAA companies stand out 
in terms of the average size of their acquisitions.  This is not surprising, given that they are much bigger 
than the other firms.  Column (6) reports on the fraction of acquisitions that are 100% paid for in cash 
and column (7) on the fraction of targets that are publicly traded.  Both fractions broadly decline as 
ratings deteriorate. 
Of particular interest for our analyses are the measures of acquisition likelihood and acquisition 
intensity displayed in columns (8) and (9).  Acquisition likelihood is a dummy variable set equal to one if a 
particular firm makes at least one acquisition in a given year, and zero otherwise, while acquisition 
intensity is set equal to the sum of all acquisitions made during a particular year, scaled by the book value 
of assets at the end of the previous year.  We winsorize acquisition intensity at its 99th percentile to 
remove the influence of extreme observations.  Eighteen percent of the firms in our sample make at least 
one acquisition during a year, amounting to 2.92% of book assets.  Note that both acquisition likelihood 
and intensity show an interesting curvilinear pattern, where firms make more acquisitions as ratings 
worsen up to a certain point, after which a further decline in ratings is associated with fewer acquisitions.  
For example, the chance that a AAA firm makes an acquisition is only 10.9%, while firms rated A are 
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almost twice as likely to make acquisitions. Firms with a B− rating are almost as likely to make 
acquisitions as AAA firms.  The same pattern emerges for acquisition intensity, except for the large 
percentage for AAA firms, which is due to a few large transactions made by these companies.  In the next 
section, we examine these patterns more formally. 
 
3.  Results 
3.1.  Credit rating levels and firm acquisitiveness 
While the univariate statistics presented in Table 1 suggest a curvilinear relation between ratings 
and acquisitiveness, it is important to control for other determinants of M&A activity.  This is what we do 
in Table 3 of the paper.  Summary statistics on the control variables employed in some of these analyses 
are reported in Table 2.  Detailed variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. 
We first estimate probit models to explain the likelihood of making at least one acquisition during a 
year as a function of the firm’s debt rating at the end of the previous year and various controls that are 
also measured at the end of the previous year.  As is common in the literature, we first translate the 
ratings variable into a numerical scale, which ranges from 1, for firms with a C rating to 21 for the highest 
rated firms (AAA).   
In the first three probit models displayed in Panel A of Table 3, we include industry (48 Fama-
French industries) and year fixed effects, as previous research suggests that there are patterns across 
industry and time in the level of acquisitions (see, for example, Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996; Harford, 
2005).  Each of the three models employs a different measure of credit ratings.  To ease the 
interpretation, we report marginal effects instead of regression coefficients.  These can be interpreted as 
the average change in the dependent variable across all observations when the rating variable increases 
by one unit.  Standard errors in all specifications are clustered at the firm level. 
The simple linear model presented in column (1) does not yield a significant relation between 
ratings and acquisition likelihood.  In model (2), we also include the square of the rating; this estimation 
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yields the curvilinear pattern that was apparent in the univariate statistics as well.  The probability of 
making an acquisition first increases and then decreases as ratings improve; the likelihood is maximized 
at a rating of about BB+.  These findings are consistent with the view that firms with poor ratings are 
unable to take all their acquisition opportunities because they are financially constrained, while highly- 
rated firms refrain from acquisitions because they value their rating and fear being downgraded when 
making acquisitions. 
In model (3), we explore whether, in addition to the pattern documented in model (2), firms 
behave differently around the threshold between investment and non-investment grade ratings.  To 
achieve this, we estimate a piece-wise linear relation with three turning points.  In particular, we estimate 
separate slopes for the following four rating categories: (i) below BB+; (ii) BB+ and BBB−; (iii) BBB to A−; 
(iv) A and above.  Estimating individual slopes for the first, third, and fourth of these pieces allows us to 
approximate the quadratic relation estimated in model (2), while the second piece allows us to capture 
possible changes in acquisition behavior at the investment grade cusp.  As argued previously, these firms 
might be especially reluctant to make acquisitions because their interest expenses are particularly 
sensitive to rating changes.  Model (3) reports that three of the four linear sections have a significant 
influence on acquisition activity.  There is a positive effect for non-investment grade firms below BB+ 
ratings, a sharp decline for firms at the investment-grade cusp, followed by a modest increase for firms 
with ratings up to and including A−; beyond A−, the likelihood of making acquisitions exhibits a 
pronounced decline of 1.6 percentage points per ratings notch. 
We also report the change in slope from the previous section at the bottom of the table.  For 
example, the value of −0.035 in the BB+<=CR<=BBB− interval represents the difference between the 
slope of 0.023 in the CR<BB+ range and the slope of −0.012 in the BB+<=CR<=BBB− range.  These changes 
are all significantly different from zero, which indicates that the breakpoints employed in the piece-wise 
linear regression reflect changes in the relation between ratings and acquisition likelihood that are 
economically meaningful. 
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At this point, these findings are only suggestive, however, because controlling for industry and time 
alone is likely insufficient to capture all the variation in acquisitiveness that is not related to credit ratings.  
We therefore amend our regression specification to include additional industry-level and firm-level 
controls as suggested by prior work.  All the control variables are measured at the end of the fiscal year 
prior to the acquisition announcement. 
At the industry level, we control for the liquidity of the M&A market (Schlingemann, Stulz, and 
Walkling, 2002), and industry concentration (Uysal, 2011).  M&A liquidity is computed as the sum of all 
acquisitions in the firms’s three-digit SIC code industry in a given year, divided by the sum of the book 
value of assets of all Compustat firms with the same three-digit SIC code in the same year.  For industry 
concentration, we employ the Herfindahl index based on the level of sales in the firm’s three-digit SIC 
code industry. 
At the firm level, we control for investment opportunities, potential misvaluation, as well as a 
number of other factors that capture financial constraints.  We use past stock performance and the 
market-to-book ratio to control for investment opportunities and misvaluation as in Harford and Uysal 
(2014).  Stock price performance is measured as the market-adjusted return in the prior fiscal year, and 
the market-to-book ratio as (book assets – book equity + market equity) / book assets.  To capture 
financial constraints, we include leverage (total interest-bearing debt to assets), cash holdings (cash to 
assets), size (log of total assets in constant 2000 dollars), and age (number of prior years with Compustat 
data available).  We also control for profitability, measured as EBITDA to total assets.  Except for age, 
Harford and Uysal (2014) employ similar controls.  Many of these firm-specific variables also affect credit 
ratings (see, for example, Baghai, Servaes, and Tamayo, 2014).  Thus, any rating effect that persists 
captures the independent effect of credit ratings beyond these determinants.  All of the control variables 
are winsorized at the 99th percentile, except for age and size.  Profitability, market-to-book, excess stock 
return, M&A market liquidity, and the Herfindahl index are also winsorized at the 1st percentile.  The 1st 
percentile of the other controls is zero. 
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The probit models with these additional controls are presented in columns (4) through (6) of Panel 
A of Table 3.  The impact of credit ratings on acquisitiveness remains highly significant, both statistically 
and economically.  While the magnitude of the various coefficients is somewhat lower than in the more 
parsimonious models, the effect we uncover remains economically important.  Based on model (6), non-
investment grade firms increase acquisition likelihood by two percentage points for each ratings increase 
by one notch, while firms with ratings above A− reduce acquisition likelihood by almost one percentage 
point per ratings notch.  In between these two groups, the decline for firms around the investment-grade 
cusp (ratings of BB+ and BBB−) is no longer statistically significant, but firms with these two rating 
categories still halt the positive trend apparent for lower-rated firms.  Once firms reach a BBB rating, the 
positive trend continues up to and including the A− level. 
The results of the control variables are also interesting.  Consistent with prior work, firms are more 
acquisitive when their industries experience higher M&A volume, when they performed well in the 
previous year, and have less debt.  Market-to-book has a negative impact on acquisition likelihood in our 
sample of rated firms, and it is significant in some specifications.  Though surprising, this result is 
consistent with Harford and Uysal (2014), who compare acquisitions of rated and unrated firms.  The 
effect of size on acquisition likelihood is negative, which is opposite to the result reported by Harford and 
Uysal (2014).  Thus, the effect of size is different once we focus on rated firms only. 
What is striking is that even after including proxies for financial constraints, such as age, cash 
holdings, leverage, and size, the positive effect of ratings on acquisition likelihood persists, which 
suggests that the effect of credit ratings is independent of these other effects.  This indicates that for 
lower-rated firms, credit ratings may capture financial constraints better than these other variables.  For 
highly-rated firms, the negative impact of ratings on acquisition likelihood suggests a strong reluctance on 
the part of managers to take any action that might jeopardize their ratings. 
To further examine the role of ratings in the acquisition process, we also include the distance-to-
default measure based on Merton’s model (1974) as an additional control variable (see also Bharath and 
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Shumway, 2008).  This measure captures how many standard deviations the value of the firm’s assets is 
removed from the face value of its debt.4  Since one of the primary roles of credit ratings is to measure 
default risk, we would expect a substantial correlation between a firm’s rating and distance-to-default, 
and this is indeed the case; the correlation is 0.61.  If the impact of credit ratings on acquisitions is due to 
this default risk channel, we would expect the influence of ratings on acquisition likelihood to decrease 
once distance-to-default is controlled for.  Columns (6) through (9) of Panel A of Table 3 contain the 
results of this augmented specification.  There is no evidence that the importance of credit ratings 
weakens, suggesting that the effect we uncover is different from a pure default risk story.  The coefficient 
on distance-to-default itself is positive, suggesting that more solvent firms make more acquisitions.5 
In Panel B of Table 3, we repeat the previous analyses using acquisition intensity as the dependent 
variable in a Tobit specification censored at zero (see also Harford and Uysal, 2014, for a similar 
approach) and report the unconditional marginal effects.6  These specifications allow us to examine 
whether our findings regarding the likelihood of making an acquisition also translate into the amount 
spent on acquisitions.  This is indeed the case; the coefficients in the tobit models show the same pattern 
as in the probit models, generally with similar levels of significance.  Where the two sets of models differ 
is in the impact of credit ratings on acquisition intensity in the piecewise model in the range between BB+ 
and BBB−.  Whereas the probit models suggest a small decline in acquisition likelihood when firms reach 
BB+ ratings, this effect is no longer statistically significant in the tobit models that include the control 
variables (models (6) and (9)).  However, the positive effect of ratings on acquisitiveness is still halted 
once firms reach a rating of BB+ and the slope coefficient is still significantly lower in the BB+ to BBB− 
range than in the <BB+ range.   
                                                          
4
 The Appendix contains a detailed description of the methods employed to compute this variable. 
5
 We have also performed a VIF (variance inflation factor) test for multicollinearity and found that the correlation 
between the explanatory variables does not materially affect our estimates. 
6
 Note that it is not possible to interpret the regression coefficients of a tobit model in the same way as OLS 
coefficients.  The coefficient of the tobit model captures the marginal effect on the latent variable.  To interpret the 
economic significance, we need to multiply the coefficient with the probability that an observation becomes 
uncensored (which means that it becomes positive in our models) (see McDonald and Moffitt, 1980).  This is the 
effect we report in the table. 
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In terms of economic significance, based on model (9), we find that acquisition intensity increases 
by 39 basis points for each increase in rating by one notch up to BB, then decreases by 25 basis points up 
to BBB−, increases by 7 basis points up to A−, before dropping off by 31 basis points per notch after that.  
This effect is considerable, given the mean acquisition intensity in the sample of 2.92%.7 
Next, we repeat the analyses in columns (3) and (9) of both Panels of Table 3 for the subsamples of 
cash and stock acquisitions separately.  This split is relevant because listed firms have the possibility of 
offering their own shares as a means of payment when cash is not available.8  Therefore, the financial 
constraints argument used to explain the acquisition behavior of low-rated firms is expected to be more 
relevant for cash acquisitions than for stock acquisitions.  For highly-rated firms, our takeover aversion 
argument implies that they reduce both cash and stock acquisitions as their rating increases.  Some firms 
employ a mix of cash and stock as payment, and for these firms we use the following procedure.  First, 
we multiple the transaction value by the proportion of the payment that is cash or stock.  Second, we 
verify that this amount still exceeds one percent of the acquirer’s market value of equity, the threshold 
applied in our previous analyses.  If so, we set the acquisition dummy in the probit models equal to one 
and include the transaction when computing acquisition intensity for the tobit models.  If not, we set the 
acquisition dummy equal to zero and exclude it from the computation of acquisition intensity.9 
We present these results in Table 4.  Panel A contains the probit and tobit models for cash 
acquisitions.  These results parallel to a large extent the findings reported in Table 3.  For instance, for 
firms with a rating below BB+, an increase in rating is associated with a substantial increase in the 
likelihood of making at least one cash-financed acquisition and with the amount spent on cash 
acquisitions.  For firms with a rating above A−, the effect is exactly the opposite.  The results for stock-
                                                          
7
 In unreported models, we have also repeated the above analysis using a matched sample approach in which we 
match each acquiring firm with three non-acquiring firms closest in size in the same year and industry (48 Fama-
French industries).  Our findings persist in these models. 
8
 See Karampatsas, Petmezas, and Travlos (2014) for evidence that lower rated firms are more likely to employ their 
shares as a form of payment in acquisitions, and for work on the other determinants of the form of payment. 
9
 Our findings are unchanged if we do not apply the second criterion before including a transaction in the cash or 
stock subsample.  They are also very similar if all transactions that are more than 50% cash financed are included in 
the cash subsample and all transactions that are more than 50% stock financed are included in the stock subsample. 
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financed acquisitions, reported in Panel B of Table 4, show a very different pattern, however; particularly 
for low-rated firms, there is no evidence of increased acquisition activity as their ratings improve.  For 
highly-rated firms, on the other hand, the negative relation between acquisitions and ratings persists.  In 
addition, for both stock and cash acquisitions, there is evidence that firms become more reluctant to 
conduct acquisitions around the investment-grade threshold.  These findings support our interpretation 
that the positive relation between acquisitions and ratings for low-rated firms is due to the relaxation of 
financial constraints while the negative relation for highly-rated firms represents general aversion to 
acquisitions.10  
 
3.2. Alternative interpretations 
Our interpretation of the results presented in Tables 3 and 4 is that ratings have a substantial 
independent impact on acquisition decisions.  In this subsection, we discuss a number of alternative 
interpretations.   
One alternative interpretation is that agencies assign ratings to companies in anticipation of future 
acquisitiveness.  Such an interpretation is wrought with problems, however, due to the non-linear nature 
of the effect we uncover.  Essentially, rating agencies would have to assign a higher rating in anticipation 
of acquisitions by low-rated companies and relatively low ratings in anticipation of acquisitions by highly-
rated companies.  Such actions do not seem very plausible.  Nevertheless, we conduct two further tests 
to rule out this interpretation.  First, we lag our measure of credit ratings by an additional year and find 
similar patterns as in Table 3 (unreported).  This makes a reverse causality story less likely because 
agencies would have to assign higher (lower) ratings to non-investment grade (investment grade) firms in 
year t in anticipation of acquisition activity in year t+2.  Second, in Section 4, we report that rating 
                                                          
10
 For cash-financed acquisitions, it is also possible to compute acquisitiveness using aggregate firm data from 
Compustat (data item AQC), although this measure does not allow us to apply the same data filters as we applied 
for the SDC-based sample.  Our findings persist when we employ this alternative measure of the amount spent on 
acquisitions (unreported). 
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agencies change their ratings in response to acquisitions; changing ratings both in anticipation of and in 
response to acquisitions does not seem very plausible, especially given that the actual likelihood of 
making acquisitions in the sample is only 18%.  In fact, changing a firm’s rating today based on such a 
small unconditional probability of doing a deal in the future seems very unlikely. 
Another interpretation for our findings is that the lack of acquisitiveness at the higher end of the 
ratings spectrum is due to the lack of acquisition opportunities.  As documented in Table 1, highly-rated 
firms are much larger than the average firm in the sample.  As such, the number of potential targets that 
meet the 1% market value equity cutoff for the acquisition to be included in our analysis may well be 
reduced.  However, we control for firm size in most specifications, and while we do find that larger firms 
are less acquisitive, inclusion of firm size in our models does not materially affect the importance of the 
ratings effect.  This result casts serious doubt on this alternative interpretation.  To further disprove it, we 
have also re-estimated our regression models separately by size terciles (not reported in a table).  The 
ratings effect is not significantly different across the three terciles, suggesting that the potential lack of 
acquisition opportunities for larger firms cannot explain our findings. 
Finally, we examine whether the negative relation between acquisitiveness and ratings for highly-
rated firms is related to the quality of the firm’s corporate governance.  Standard and Poor’s indicates 
explicitly that corporate governance attributes are taken into account when evaluating the credit risk of a 
firm.  Thus, firms with better ratings could have better governance and since a substantial fraction of 
acquisitions destroy shareholder wealth, it is possible that better-governed firms simply undertake fewer 
acquisitions.  We conduct two tests to address this possibility.  First, we divide the sample into 
acquisitions with positive and negative announcement returns and repeat our tests on each subset.  If 
better-rated firms make fewer poor acquisitions, we should observe a negative relation between credit 
ratings and acquisitions for the subset of acquisitions with negative announcement returns, but not for 
acquisitions that are well received by the market.  Of course, this relation should only hold for firms with 
ratings above A−, for which the relation is downward sloping for the sample as a whole.  We find no 
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significant differences between good and bad acquisitions in the regression coefficients on any of the 
piece-wise credit rating sections (not reported in a table).  These results do not support the governance 
argument.  Second, we include two proxies for corporate governance directly in the acquisition 
regressions: (a) board independence, measured as the fraction of directors that are outsiders, and 
obtained from the ISS database (available for less than half of our sample firms), and (b) the number of 
institutional investors that are blockholders in the firm, where a blockholder is defined as an investor 
owning more than 5% of the shares; these data are obtained from Thomson Reuters 13-f filings.  
Inclusion of these measures does not affect our main findings (not reported in a table).  Interestingly, we 
find that firms with more independent boards and more institutional blockholders make fewer 
acquisitions. 
 
3.3. Past rating changes and firm acquisitiveness  
In this section, we study the impact of past rating changes on acquisition activity.  This is relevant 
because prior work has shown that credit rating changes exhibit positive serial autocorrelation (see, for 
example, Altman and Kao, 1992; Lando and Skødeberg, 2002).  That is, a past downgrade (upgrade) tends 
to be followed by another downgrade (upgrade).  If past credit rating changes serve as a good signal for 
upcoming rating shifts, they may also influence firms’ M&A decisions.  In particular, we would expect 
firms that have been downgraded recently to curtail their acquisition activities.  This effect applies at 
both ends of the ratings scale.  At the top end, firms that attach value to ratings per se will do their 
utmost to avoid additional downgrades and reducing acquisitiveness could be one of the actions these 
firms can take.  At the bottom end, expectations of additional downgrades could already serve to 
constrain recently downgraded firms from taking on all their acquisition opportunities.  Low-rated firms 
that received a recent upgrade, on the other hand, may be more willing to take on acquisitions (relative 
to firms with the same rating that have not been upgraded recently), given that expected additional 
upgrades would further relieve financial constraints and the acquisition is less likely to put downward 
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pressure on their ratings.  For highly-rated firms, recent upgrades should have little effect on acquisition 
activity.  If anything, the expectation of additional upgrades may lead these firms to curb acquisition 
activity even more. 
 We measure lagged upgrades and downgrades in the two-year period before the acquisition, and 
present summary statistics on these variables in Table 5.  The distributions of upgrades and downgrades 
are quite similar, except that more of the lower-rated firms have recently been downgraded.  
In Table 6, we study the impact of recent upgrades and downgrades on acquisition activity.  We 
present both probit (Panel A) and tobit (Panel B) models for the entire sample as well as separate models 
for various rating categories.  All the regressions include industry and firm controls as well as industry and 
year dummies, but their coefficients are not reported for sake of brevity.  The table reports the marginal 
effects for the probit specifications and the unconditional marginal effects for the tobit models.  The 
results indicate that firms cut acquisition activity dramatically if they have been downgraded recently.  
For the sample as a whole, firms that have recently been downgraded are 6.6 percentage points less 
likely to make acquisitions, which is substantial given the average acquisition likelihood of 18%.  The 
impact appears similar across rating categories, but it is important to keep in mind that the unconditional 
acquisition intensity differs across rating categories, and is smaller for highly-rated firms.  Thus, the 
proportional impact of a recent downgrade on acquisition activity is larger for firms in the highest rating 
categories.11 
Lagged upgrades have no significant impact on acquisitions, except for BB+ and BBB− firms, which 
are more likely to make acquisitions.  In unreported models, we find that this result is entirely due to 
BBB− firms.  These are companies that have recently been upgraded to investment grade.  If there is 
                                                          
11
 Note that the number of observations in the probit models estimated by various rating categories does not add 
up to the total.  This is due to the fact that a number of observations perfectly predict the success or failure in the 
dependent variable and these observations are dropped from the estimation.  This is more likely to happen when 
the models are estimated for separate rating categories than for the overall sample. 
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momentum in rating changes, these firms are less likely to be downgraded again, thereby opening up the 
opportunity to make more acquisitions. 
 
3.4. Abnormal returns 
 In this section we study the relation between the abnormal returns associated with acquisition 
announcements and prior credit ratings.  If the positive relation between credit ratings and M&A activity 
at lower levels of ratings is indeed due to the easing of credit constraints, then this interpretation also has 
implications for the relation between announcement returns and ratings.  Specifically, we expect returns 
to decline as ratings improve for firms with non-investment grade ratings as these companies are able to 
take on more marginal acquisition opportunities.  This analysis is similar in spirit to the work of Harford 
and Uysal (2014) who compare announcement returns of rated and unrated firms.  At upper echelons of 
the ratings scale, the prediction is reversed; if such firms are particularly averse to acquisitions, they 
should only take the very best opportunities, and we would expect announcement returns to increase as 
ratings improve. 
 We compute abnormal returns as in Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002) using the market-
adjusted approach, where we subtract the daily market return from the daily return of the acquirer (see 
also Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz, 2004; 2005).  We use the value-weighted CRSP index as a proxy for 
the market and cumulate abnormal returns over an event window of five days centered around the 
announcement date.  To remove the influence of outliers, we winsorize abnormal returns at the 1st and 
99th percentiles.  Average returns for the entire sample are displayed in the last line of Table 2.  
Consistent with the literature (see, for example, Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz, 2007), they are slightly 
positive at 90 basis points, on average, with a median of 60 basis points.  Both are significantly different 
from zero with p-values of 0.00.   
 Table 7 contains various specifications of the abnormal return regression models.  Following the 
extant literature, we include a set of firm and deal characteristics as control variables together with year 
21 
 
and industry dummies.12  In the first three models, we only report results for the first acquisition made by 
a given firm during a year.  As we will show in subsequent analyses, acquisitions affect future ratings; it is 
therefore not clear that the firm’s rating is still the same when it makes the second or subsequent 
acquisition in a year, and focusing on the first acquisition addresses this measurement error.  But we 
show in model (4) that our findings persist if we employ all acquisitions as well.  Model (1) presents the 
results of a simple linear model, while models (2) and (3) allow for non-linearity.  Consistent with the 
financial constraints argument, model (1) shows that returns decline by 16 basis points per ratings notch 
increase.  Increasing ratings by one standard deviation (3.66) lowers abnormal returns by 59 basis points, 
which is quite substantial compared to the sample average of 90 basis points.  These findings suggest that 
as firms become more acquisitive, the overall quality of their acquisitions declines. 
Model (2) shows the results of a quadratic specification, which illustrates that the impact of rating 
increases on announcement returns is much more dramatic at low rating levels, but tapers off at higher 
rating levels, and turns positive at a rating beyond A (the inflection point of the quadratic regression).  
These results are the mirror image of the findings on acquisitiveness; as firms become more acquisitive 
when ratings improve from the lowest levels, returns decline, and when the acquisition rate declines 
beyond a higher rating threshold, returns improve again.  The negative relation between returns and 
ratings and the tapering off effect are what one would expect under a financial constraints interpretation: 
as ratings improve, the marginal relaxation of financial constraints is smaller. 
To explore the positive relation between ratings and returns beyond the inflection point in more 
detail, we report a specification equivalent to the piece-wise linear regression model displayed in column 
(3) of Table 3, in which we estimate separate slopes for the following rating ranges: C up to and including 
BB; BB+ and BBB−; BBB up to and including A−; A up to and including AAA.  These models indicate that 
                                                          
12
 In unreported models, we also control for the following acquirer characteristics: leverage, market-to-book, and 
cash holdings.  The coefficients on these variables are never significantly different from zero and we therefore omit 
them from the reported specifications.  Their lack of significance is perhaps not a surprise because these 
characteristics are related to industry association and all our models include industry dummies. 
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the entire effect of ratings on returns comes from the ratings up to and including BB.  Beyond that level, 
there are no changes in acquisition quality as ratings improve further, and while the sign on the fourth 
piece is positive, it does not approach statistical significance.  Thus, while there is a suggestion of 
improving returns once ratings reach a certain level based on the quadratic model, this result does not 
appear to be very robust. 
For completeness, we repeat model (3) but also include deals that are not the first acquisition by a 
firm in a given year.  This specification is reported in model (4).  Our findings generally persist albeit at 
lower levels of significance. 
Overall, the findings from our event study support our interpretation that the ratings capture 
financial constraints at low rating levels.  While our models of acquisition activity include other measures 
of constraints as well, the consistency between the event study models and acquisition models supports 
the view that ratings capture constraints better than the other variables included in our models.  At high 
rating levels, the models on returns and levels of acquisitions are not fully consistent with each other in 
that the reduction in acquisitiveness is not associated with significant improvements in returns.  One 
possibility, of course, is that acquirer returns are generally small and given that fewer transactions occur 
at higher rating levels, we have little power to pick up a significant change in returns. 
Our maintained assumption so far is that acquisitions put pressure on ratings, which may serve as a 
particular deterrent for highly-rated firms to be involved in M&A.  In the next section, we explore this 
conjecture in detail. 
 
 4. The impact of acquisitions on future credit ratings 
 
Mergers and acquisitions are known to increase acquirers’ default risk and leverage levels (see, for 
example, Billett, King, and Mauer, 2004; Furfine and Rosen, 2011).  Therefore, such transactions are likely 
to put downward pressure on acquirers’ credit ratings in the post-merger period.  To assess whether this 
is indeed the case in our sample, we adopt two sets of analyses. 
23 
 
We start by documenting the likelihood of downgrades after acquisitions for all the rating 
categories.  These findings are presented in Panel A of Table 8.  The results show an interesting pattern.  
Highly-rated firms are more likely to be downgraded after acquisitions, while the opposite is true for 
firms with a low rating.  For example, AA firms that make acquisitions have about one chance in three of 
being downgraded compared to one chance in five if they do not make an acquisition.  BB firms, on the 
other hand, have an 18% chance of being downgraded when they make an acquisition, but a 23% chance 
if they do not.  In Panel B, we summarize the probabilities for the various rating ranges considered in our 
piece-wise linear estimation.  These confirm the pattern established in Panel A: firms with a rating of BB 
or below are less likely to be downgraded after making an acquisition, while firms with a rating above A− 
are more likely to be downgraded after acquiring.  For firms in between these thresholds the likelihood of 
being downgraded does not depend much on the company’s acquisitiveness.  This evidence can explain 
why highly-rated firms are reluctant to make acquisitions if they value their rating: the chance of a 
downgrade increases substantially.  Note that we do not claim that these downgrades are undeserved; 
the acquisition will likely increase the default risk of the acquirer.  All we argue is that if highly-rated firms 
attach particular value to their ratings, they will be reluctant to make acquisitions that increase the risk of 
a downgrade. 
One possibility is that the above results are not caused by the acquisition as such, but by the 
associated stock price response.  It could be that the downgrades are only caused by acquisitions that 
have been poorly received by the stock market.  To verify whether this is the case, we split the 
acquisitions in Panel B into those that were poorly received and those that were not.  For firms that made 
multiple acquisitions in a given year, we use the average across all their deals to determine the market’s 
reception.  These findings are reported in Panel C of Table 8.  For firms with a rating above A−, the 
likelihood of a downgrade is 30.8% after making acquisitions with negative announcement returns, which 
is indeed larger than the 26.9% after making acquisitions that have been well received, albeit that the 
two likelihoods are not significantly different from each other.  What is striking is that these figures are 
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significantly larger than the 21.2% likelihood of a downgrade when not making acquisitions at all.  For 
firms in the other rating categories, we also find a greater likelihood of a downgrade following a bad 
compared to a good acquisition, and this difference is significant for ratings below BB+ and between BBB 
and A−. 
Compared to not making an acquisition at all, firms with ratings below BB+ reduce the likelihood of 
being downgraded by more than nine percentage points when making a good acquisition, but even when 
making a poor acquisition, the probability of being downgraded is lower relative to not making an 
acquisition at all.13, 14 
In the next set of tests, we investigate whether ratings are affected by acquisition decisions after 
taking into account all the changes in the firm’s financial characteristics due to the financing of the 
transactions and the combination of the acquirer and the target, both of which are likely to affect the 
default risk of the merged company.  We implement a difference-in-differences approach in which the 
treatment is the announcement of at least one M&A deal in year t by a particular firm, the treated firm in 
our setting.  The aim is to assess, by relying on a double differencing, whether the change in rating 
between the control period (t−1) and post-treatment period (t+1) is different between treated firms (i.e., 
acquisitive firms in year t) and control firms (i.e., non-acquisitive firms).  Our specifications also control 
for year dummies and industry fixed effects, as well as for the changes in firm characteristics.  These 
variables are likely influenced by the financing of the transaction and the combination of the target and 
the acquirer.  The set of firm characteristics employed in the analyses is similar to the ones used by 
Baghai, Servaes, and Tamayo (2014). 
                                                          
13
 Again, we are not claiming that the reduced likelihood of a downgrade after an acquisition is undeserved for firms 
with a low rating.  The change in the financial characteristics of the firm due to the acquisition may well improve 
credit risk, even if the acquisition reduces shareholder wealth.  The goal of this analysis is simply to document what 
happens to these firms’ ratings so that we can understand how this expectation affects acquisitiveness. 
14
 We have also compared the likelihood of being upgraded across firms that make no acquisitions, those that make 
good acquisitions, and those that make poor acquisitions.  In general, the pattern is the reverse of the one 
documented for downgrades: highly-rated acquirers are less likely to be upgraded after making acquisitions, while 
low-rated acquirers are more likely to be upgraded.  However, the differences in probabilities are small and they are 
generally not statistically significant. 
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The results are reported in Panel A of Table 9.  The dependent variable in column (1) is the change 
in rating between the control and post-treatment period, while in column (2) it is a dummy variable 
identifying a rating downgrade between the control and the post-treatment periods.  We estimate an OLS 
model in column (1) and a probit model in column (2).15 
The coefficient estimates of the acquisition dummy in Panel A of Table 9 are highly significant and 
suggest that even after controlling for changes in their characteristics, firms that have made a recent 
acquisition are more likely to experience a decline in their rating.  In particular, the negative coefficient in 
the first model indicates that a firm’s rating declines by 0.06 notches if it makes at least one acquisition in 
the previous year, while model (2) indicates that firms that make acquisitions in a particular year are 
more likely to be downgraded in the following year.  In terms of economic significance, the probit results 
in column (2) show that acquirers are 1.9 percentage points more likely to be downgraded compared to 
other firms, an increase of more than 9% over the sample average of 21%.  Again, it is important to stress 
that this result holds after controlling for all the changes in the firm’s financial characteristics, many of 
which may have changed because it conducted an acquisition.  In other words, the effect we document is 
the net effect, purely related to making an acquisition.  Concerning the control variables, as expected, 
increases in leverage and firm risk are associated with a decrease in credit ratings in the post-treatment 
period, while increases in firm size, profitability, interest coverage, and market-to-book lead to an 
improvement in credit ratings.16 
                                                          
15
 We have also re-estimated the change in ratings model of column (1) using an ordered probit model.  The 
advantage of ordered probit models is that they only assume that higher numbers reflect more substantial rating 
changes without ascribing a particular value to the exact magnitude of the rating change.  The advantage of OLS 
models, on the other hand, is that they are more straightforward to interpret.  Our findings persist when we use an 
ordered probit model instead. 
16 
The coefficient on the ΔNegative Debt / EBITDA dummy appears to be counterintuitive.  It suggests that firms 
whose ratio of Debt / EBITDA turns negative from year t-1 to year  t+1 receive a higher rating and are less likely to 
be downgraded.  Further analyses indicate that this effect is due to the correlation between the negative debt to 
EBITDA dummy and profitability.  If we remove the change in profitability from the model, the coefficient on the 
change in negative debt to EBITDA dummy becomes significantly negative.  Inclusion or exclusion of this dummy or 
of profitability does not affect the statistical or economic significance of the acquisition effect. 
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This evidence suggests that acquisitions put pressure on acquirer credit ratings, as credit rating 
agencies sanction acquirers ex post.  As a result, it is not surprising that highly-rated acquirers, who 
attach particular value to their rating, are more hesitant to make acquisitions compared to firms with 
lower ratings. 
As we already documented in Table 8, however, the likelihood of highly-rated firms being 
downgraded depends partly on the quality of their acquisitions, as measured by the stock price response 
upon the announcement of the transactions.  In models (3) and (4) of Panel A of Table 9, we verify 
whether this is still the case after controlling for firm characteristics.  Interestingly, we continue to find a 
negative effect on ratings for poor acquisitions, but not for acquisitions that are well-received by the 
market.17  The economic significance of the negative effect is also more substantial than the effect 
documented in the first two columns where all acquisitions are combined.  For example, based on model 
(4), firms that make acquisitions with negative announcement returns experience an increased likelihood 
of being downgraded of 4.3 percentage points relative to firms with the same characteristics that have 
not made poor acquisitions.  This evidence suggests that firms that make poor acquisitions get punished 
twice: once when they announce the acquisitions and a second time when they are being downgraded.  It 
also indicates that rating agencies actively monitor the acquisition behavior of companies. 
Of course, it is possible that the effect of acquisition returns on rating changes is just due to the 
firm’s overall stock market performance.  To determine whether acquirer announcement returns have an 
independent effect on rating changes, we augment the regression specifications reported in Panel A of 
Table 9 with the market-adjusted stock return earned by the firm during years t (the acquisition year) and 
t+1.  These findings are presented in Panel B of Table 9; for sake of brevity, we do not report the 
coefficients on the control variables in this panel.  Our results are robust to this inclusion: firms that make 
acquisitions receive lower ratings and are more likely to be downgraded, and the entire effect is due to 
                                                          
17
 We have also verified that the coefficients on the dummies for acquisitions with positive and acquisitions with 
negative announcement returns are significantly different from each at the 5% level or better. 
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firms with poor acquisition performance.  Not surprisingly, we also find that overall stock market 
performance is positively related to rating changes (models (1) and (3)) and negatively related to the 
likelihood of a downgrade (models (2) and (4)).  The fact that the acquisition returns affect ratings after 
controlling for excess returns in the prior years, which also covers the period around the acquisition, 
indicates that rating agencies attach more weight to acquisition announcement returns than to general 
stock price performance. 
Since we document in Table 8 that the post-acquisition rating changes are different across the 
ratings spectrum, we also investigate whether these differences persist after controlling for firm 
characteristics.  To that end, we re-estimate models (3) and (4) of Panel B of Table 9, but allow the effect 
of good and bad acquisitions to vary depending on the range of the firm’s ratings level in year t-1.  We 
define four dummies, one for each of the four ranges of ratings we consider in the models of acquisition 
likelihood, and interact these dummies with dummies for acquisition quality.  The results of these models 
are reported in Panel C of Table 9.  We also report p-values of tests of equality of the coefficients for 
good and bad acquisitions.  Several new findings emerge.  Highly-rated firms are more likely to see their 
ratings decline and to be downgraded after making acquisitions, and this effect does not appear to 
depend much on acquisition quality.  Firms in the second highest ratings group (BBB to A-) only 
experience a downgrade for poor acquisitions, not for good acquisitions.  For firms around the non-
investment grade threshold, acquisitions have no significant impact on ratings changes.  Finally, for firms 
with a rating below BB+, acquisitions are good news for ratings, irrespective of whether the stock market 
reacted positively or not. 
These results shed further light on our previous findings of a non-linear relation between ratings 
and acquisitiveness.  Since highly-rated firms are most likely to get punished by rating agencies after 
making acquisitions, they are very reluctant to engage in these types of transactions.  If ratings at the top 
end of the ratings scale are a particular testament to the value these firms attach to their ratings, then a 
decline in merger activity by half, such as the one we observe when firms move from A− to AAA ratings, is 
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no surprise.  Even if the deal is positively received by the stock market, the subsequent negative response 
from rating agencies may negate this benefit.  Firms at the lower end of the ratings spectrum, on the 
other hand, experience a rating increase as a relaxation of financial constraints, giving them breathing 
room to make more deals. Moreover, they generally experience rating upgrades after making 
acquisitions.   
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
This paper documents a curvilinear relation between credit rating levels and acquisitions.  At low 
rating levels, increases in firm rating lead to more acquisitions, accompanied by lower announcement 
returns, while at high ratings, additional rating increases reduce acquisitiveness, without materially 
affecting associated returns.  This pattern is broken by firms that are at the cusp between investment and 
non-investment grade ratings, which curtail acquisitions as well.  We also find that acquisitions have a 
negative impact on credit ratings for highly-rated firms, even after controlling for all the firm 
characteristics potentially affected by the transaction itself; firms with low ratings, on the other hand, are 
more likely to see their ratings increase after making an acquisition. 
From this work, we draw several conclusions.  First, credit ratings have an independent effect on 
acquisition decisions since we control for a large number of characteristics associated with ratings in our 
models.  Second, ratings may serve as an alternative and potentially better measure of financial 
constraints than other variables.  Third, rating agencies not only pay attention to a firm’s financial 
characteristics, but also how it got there; at the higher end of the ratings spectrum, firms have lower 
ratings if they were more acquisitive in the past, even if they have the same characteristics as other 
companies.  Fourth, the negative response of rating agencies to acquisitions that are poorly received by 
the market indicates that acquirers get punished twice for having been deemed to overpay for a 
company, once by the stock market and once by the rating agencies.  Managers and investment banks 
alike should take this information into account when engaging in M&A transactions.  This evidence also 
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indicates that rating agencies pay attention to shareholder returns when making a judgement about 
changes in bondholder risk.  Fifth, the reluctance of highly-rated firms to make acquisitions suggests that 
these firms attach particular value to their rating and may well be foregoing good investment 
opportunities.  Studying the benefits associated with higher ratings and measuring the precise cost 
associated with the reluctance to make acquisitions requires further study. 
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Appendix. Variable definitions 
Dependent Variables 
 
Acquisition likelihood: Binary variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm announced at least one 
acquisition in year t, 0 otherwise. The variable is created using data from Thomson Financial SDC. 
  
Acquisition intensity: The sum of the deal values of all completed acquisitions announced in year t scaled 
by the firm’s total assets in year t-1.  Deal values are from Thomson Financial SDC, assets are from 
COMPUSTAT.  Only transactions larger than 1% of market equity are included in the sample. 
 
Acquirer CARs: Cumulative abnormal return for the acquiring firm over the 5-day event window (-2, +2) 
around the announcement day.  The abnormal return is computed as the market-adjusted return using 
the value-weighted CRSP index as a proxy for the market.  
 
Firm variables 
 
Credit rating level: Continuous variable for rated firms from COMPUSTAT which takes the value from 1 (C 
rating) to 21 (AAA rating).  The ratings are Standard and Poor’s ratings. 
 
Distance-to-Default: A measure of default risk, based on the structural model of Merton (1974).  Distance 
to default (DD) is the difference between the asset value of the firm (V) and the face value of its debt (F), 
divided by the standard deviation of the firm’s asset value (σV).  We use an iterative procedure by solving 
a system of two nonlinear equations to estimate asset value and volatility.  In this system, equity (E) is 
priced as a European call option on the value of the firm’s assets with time to maturity (T) equal to one 
year.  Following Vassalou and Xing (2004), F corresponds to debt in current liabilities plus one-half of 
long-term debt since this approach takes into account the fact that long-term debt might not be due until 
after the horizon of the DD estimation.  As initial values for asset value and asset volatility, we use V = E + 
F and σV = σE *(E/E+F) where E is the market value of equity at the end of each calendar year and σE is the 
annualized standard deviation of daily stock returns from the prior year.  Distance to default is computed 
as: 
𝐷𝐷 =  
𝑙𝑛(𝑉/𝐹)+ 0.06+𝑅𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑙−
1
2
𝜎𝑉
2
𝜎𝑉
,       
where Rbill is the Treasury bill rate, and 0.06 is an empirical proxy for the equity premium following 
Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008). 
 
Size: Firm total assets at the fiscal year-end from COMPUSTAT in US$ millions deflated using the CPI index 
with the base year 2000.  The regressions use the natural log of this variable. 
 
Profitability: Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) divided by total 
assets. 
 
Cash holdings: Cash holdings divided by total assets. 
 
Age: Number of years the firm has been covered by COMPUSTAT at the time of the acquisition 
announcement. 
 
Excess stock return: Market adjusted return (using the value-weighted CRSP index as benchmark). 
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Market-to-book: Market value of the firm (Total assets − book value of equity + market value of equity) 
divided by total assets.  
 
Leverage: Total financial debt (long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities) divided by total assets. 
 
Capex: Capital expenditures divided by total assets. 
 
Interest coverage: EBITDA over interest expenses. 
 
Rental: Rental payments divided by total assets. 
 
Debt/EBITDA: Long-term and short-term debt divided by EBITDA. 
 
Negative Debt/EBITDA: Indicator variable set equal to 1 if Debt/EBITDA is negative and 0 otherwise.  
 
Convertible: Convertible debt divided by total assets. 
 
Subordinated: Subordinated debt divided by total assets. 
 
PPE: Net property, plant and equipment divided by total assets. 
 
Volatility: The volatility of profitability, computed using the current year’s data as well as the four 
previous years’.  At least two years of data are required in its computation.  
 
StDevRet: The annualized standard deviation of daily returns for a given year.   
 
Lagged upgrade: A binary variable that takes the value of 1 if a firm has been upgraded at least once in 
the previous two years, 0 otherwise.  
 
Lagged downgrade: A binary variable that takes the value of 1 if a firm has been downgraded at least 
once in the previous two years, 0 otherwise.  
 
Earnings: Earnings before extraordinary items divided by total assets. 
 
CFO: Operating cash flow divided by total assets. 
 
Industry variables 
 
M&A liquidity: Sum of acquisitions made in a given year and three-digit SIC code industry, divided by the 
sum of total assets of all COMPUSTAT firms with the same three-digit SIC code. 
 
Herfindahl index: Sum of squares of the market shares of all firms in a given year and three-digit SIC 
industry, where market share is defined as sales of the firm divided by the sum of the sales in the 
industry. 
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Deal characteristics 
 
Deal value: Value of the transaction from SDC in constant (year 2000) US$ million. 
 
Relative size: Ratio of the deal value and the market capitalization of the acquiring firm 4 weeks prior to 
the acquisition announcement.  
 
Horizontal: Binary variable that takes the value of 1 if the target firm operates in the same 3-digit SIC 
code industry as the acquirer, 0 otherwise.  
 
Public: Binary variable that takes the value of 1 if the target firm is a public firm, 0 otherwise.  
 
Cash: Binary variable that takes the value of 1 for deals where the method of payment is 100% cash, 0 
otherwise.  
 
Cross-border: Binary variable that takes the value of 1 for acquisitions of non-US target firms, 0 
otherwise. 
 
Tender: Binary variable that takes the value of 1 for tender offers, 0 otherwise.  
 
Hostile: Binary variable that takes the value of 1 for deals defined as “hostile” or “unsolicited” by SDC, 0 
otherwise. 
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Table 1 
Firm and deal characteristics by rating level 
 
This table provides the rating distribution and reports statistics of firm and deal characteristics for each rating category for our sample of U.S. 
rated publicly listed firms making acquisitions over the period 1990-2012.  N denotes the number of firm-year observations in the sample.  The 
mean value of firm size is presented in the third column.  Column (4) presents the number of M&A deals and column (5) presents the mean deal 
value.  Column (6) displays the proportion of pure cash deals (payment is 100% cash) and column (7) the proportion of listed targets.  Acquisition 
likelihood (column (8)) is the proportion of firms in our sample that conduct at least one acquisition exceeding 1% of the firm’s market value of 
equity in a given year t.  Acquisition intensity (column (9)) is the sum of all acquisition exceeding 1% of the firm’s market value of equity 
completed by a firm in a given year divided by its total assets in year t-1.  All dollar values are in millions and adjusted to 2000 dollars by the 
consumer price index (CPI). 
 
Rating level 
 
(1) 
N 
 
(2) 
Firm size  
 
(3) 
Number of 
acquisitions 
(4) 
Deal value  
 
(5) 
All Cash 
 
(6) 
Public  
Target 
(7) 
Acquisition 
likelihood 
(8) 
Acquisition 
intensity 
(9) 
AAA 323 81,457 37 13,338 51.35% 54.05% 10.87% 2.56% 
AA+ 112 64,961 18 1,103 33.33% 33.33% 15.18% 0.89% 
AA 403 47,147 63 3,057 50.79% 49.21% 13.90% 1.86% 
AA- 468 29,483 97 3,947 27.84% 41.24% 16.67% 2.51% 
A+ 857 23,477 200 1,808 37.31% 35.82% 18.55% 2.46% 
A 1,543 18,342 409 1,500 42.82% 33.33% 21.45% 2.84% 
A– 1,266 17,306 317 1,733 36.59% 37.22% 20.06% 2.89% 
BBB+ 1,633 14,025 343 912 42.44% 28.78% 17.15% 2.72% 
BBB 2,082 8,967 502 635 42.26% 26.19% 18.59% 2.47% 
BBB– 1,787 8,277 405 896 35.78% 24.51% 19.02% 3.04% 
BB+ 1,298 5,886 309 1,066 32.69% 19.74% 19.18% 3.44% 
BB 1,879 3,703 472 447 35.94% 15.86% 19.37% 3.25% 
BB– 2,400 2,747 661 379 33.08% 16.92% 19.46% 3.67% 
B+ 2,263 2,117 610 225 31.31% 12.62% 18.82% 3.40% 
B 1,228 3,896 222 300 30.18% 17.12% 13.11% 2.34% 
B– 596 3,235 74 348 28.38% 17.57% 10.07% 2.08% 
Below B– 350 3,075 33 441 21.21% 30.30% 7.14% 1.86% 
All levels 20,488 11,072 4,772 973 36.21% 23.86% 18.00% 2.92% 
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Table 2 
Summary statistics 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics for the universe of U.S. rated publicly listed firms over the 
period 1989-2011.  Variable definitions are in the Appendix.  The table reports the number of 
observations, mean, median and standard deviation of the corresponding variables.  All dollar values are 
in millions and adjusted to 2000 dollars by the consumer price index (CPI).  The last row contains the 
abnormal announcement return for those firms that make acquisitions over the period 1990-2012. 
 
 N Mean Median Std. dev. 
Credit rating level 20,488 11.770 12.000 3.664 
Acquisition likelihood 20,488 0.180 0.000 0.384 
Acquisition intensity 20,488 0.029 0.000 0.110 
Distance-to-default 19,285 6.613 5.779 4.028 
Size ($million) 20,488 11,072 2,548 35,662 
Profitability 20,402 0.138 0.134 0.076 
Cash holdings 20,476 0.086 0.049 0.102 
Age 20, 488 21.46 19.000 12.976 
Excess stock return 19,627 0.052 -0.006 0.474 
Market-to-book 19,831 1.690 1.428 0.875 
Leverage 20,432 0.353 0.315 0.213 
M&A liquidity 20,481 0.033 0.010 0.064 
Herfindahl index 20,483 0.170 0.127 0.147 
Acquirer CARs (-2, +2) 4,772 0.90% 0.60% 6.6% 
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Table 3  
Credit rating levels and acquisitions  
 
This table presents the effect of credit rating levels on acquisitions announced over the period 1990-2012 for all U.S. publicly listed firms with 
available credit ratings over the period 1989-2011.  Panel A presents marginal effects of probit specifications and Panel B unconditional marginal 
effects of tobit specifications.  The dependent variable in the probit models (Panel A) takes the value of 1 if the firm announced at least one 
acquisition exceeding 1% of the market value of its equity in year t, and 0 otherwise. The dependent variable in the tobit models (Panel B) is the 
ratio of the sum of all acquisitions exceeding 1% of market equity announced by a firm in year t, divided by total assets at the end of year t–1.  
Columns (3), (6) and (9) are piecewise regressions with three different breakpoints.  At the bottom of each panel, we report the change in slope 
from the preceding rating category.  The explanatory variables are lagged by one year with respect to the dependent variable.  Variable 
definitions are in the Appendix.  All models include year and industry fixed effects, whose coefficients are suppressed and are based on calendar 
year and Fama-French 48 industry classification dummies, respectively.  CR stands for credit rating level.  The z-statistics reported in parentheses 
are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and acquirer clustering. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 3 (continued) - Panel A. Probit models 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
CR 0.002 0.043***  0.005** 0.038***  -0.001 0.033***  
 (1.61) (6.93)  (2.38) (5.44)  (-0.34) (4.79)  
CR
 
squared
 
 -0.002***   -0.001***   -0.001***  
  (-6.61)   (-4.88)   (-4.95)  
CR < BB+   0.023***   0.020***   0.016*** 
   (6.54)   (4.87)   (3.70) 
BB+ <= CR <=BBB–   -0.012*   -0.004   -0.012* 
   (-1.93)   (-0.66)   (-1.75) 
BBB– < CR <= A–   0.007   0.010*   0.006 
   (1.48)   (1.90)   (1.11) 
CR > A–   -0.016***   -0.009**   -0.016*** 
   (-3.66)   (-1.97)   (-3.23) 
Distance-to-default       0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 
       (7.86) (8.10) (8.16) 
Ln (Size)    -0.021*** -0.022*** -0.021*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.019*** 
    (-5.14) (-5.23) (-5.16) (-4.49) (-4.57) (-4.48) 
Profitability    0.101* 0.081 0.076 0.073 0.050 0.045 
    (1.85) (1.47) (1.38) (1.30) (0.90) (0.80) 
Cash holdings    -0.002 0.014 0.014 0.019 0.035 0.036 
    (-0.06) (0.33) (0.35) (0.45) (0.85) (0.86) 
Age    0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    (1.31) (1.48) (1.50) (0.56) (0.73) (0.75) 
Excess stock return    0.033*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.034*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 
    (5.42) (5.30) (5.30) (5.41) (5.28) (5.28) 
Market-to-book    -0.010** -0.007 -0.007 -0.021*** -0.018*** -0.019*** 
    (-1.97) (-1.45) (-1.49) (-3.94) (-3.48) (-3.54) 
Leverage    -0.060*** -0.043** -0.045** -0.010 0.008 0.006 
    (-2.78) (-1.98) (-2.05) (-0.46) (0.35) (0.27) 
M&A liquidity    0.572*** 0.564*** 0.562*** 0.579*** 0.571*** 0.568*** 
    (11.98) (11.89) (11.84) (12.06) (11.97) (11.91) 
Herfindahl index    0.005 0.008 0.010 -0.004 -0.001 0.001 
    (0.18) (0.26) (0.32) (-0.13) (-0.05) (0.02) 
Year and ind. dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R² 0.031 0.035 0.036 0.047 0.049 0.049 0.052 0.054 0.055 
Observations 20,432 20,432 20,432 19,372 19,372 19,372 19,042 19,042 19,042 
Change in slope          
BB+ <= CR <=BBB–   -0.035***   -0.025***   -0.028*** 
   (-4.17)   (-2.82)   (-3.11) 
BBB– < CR <= A–   0.019*   0.014   0.018* 
   (1.96)   (1.38)   (1.73) 
CR > A–   -0.023***   -0.019**   -0.022*** 
   (-2.97)   (-2.38)   (-2.72) 
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Table 3 (continued) - Panel B. Tobit models 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
CR 0.0000 0.0100***  0.0009** 0.0084***  -0.0001 0.0075***  
 (0.13) (6.48)  (2.20) (5.32)  (-0.22) (4.72)  
CR
 
squared
 
 -0.0004***   -0.0003***   -0.0003***  
  (-6.43)   (-4.84)   (-4.87)  
CR < BB+   0.0051***   0.0049***   0.0039*** 
   (6.17)   (4.97)   (3.96) 
BB+ <= CR <=BBB–   -0.0035**   -0.0010   -0.0025 
   (-2.41)   (-0.68)   (-1.57) 
BBB– < CR <= A–   0.0010   0.0016   0.0007 
   (0.94)   (1.38)   (0.65) 
CR > A–   -0.0037***   -0.0018*   -0.0031*** 
   (-3.69)   (-1.74)   (-2.84) 
Distance-to-default       0.0022*** 0.0022*** 0.0022*** 
       (6.86) (7.05) (7.12) 
Ln (Size)    -0.0063*** -0.0064*** -0.0063*** -0.0057*** -0.0058*** -0.0057*** 
    (-6.79) (-6.90) (-6.83) (-6.16) (-6.25) (-6.16) 
Profitability    0.0255* 0.0210 0.0191 0.0208 0.0160 0.0140 
    (1.90) (1.56) (1.42) (1.53) (1.17) (1.02) 
Cash holdings    0.0068 0.0103 0.0108 0.0110 0.0146 0.0151 
    (0.73) (1.12) (1.17) (1.18) (1.58) (1.63) 
Age    0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
    (0.89) (1.09) (1.15) (0.18) (0.38) (0.44) 
Excess stock return    0.0078*** 0.0077*** 0.0077*** 0.0079*** 0.0078*** 0.0078*** 
    (5.27) (5.14) (5.13) (5.21) (5.08) (5.07) 
Market-to-book    -0.0000 0.0005 0.0005 -0.0021 -0.0015 -0.0015 
    (-0.03) (0.44) (0.44) (-1.58) (-1.15) (-1.17) 
Leverage    -0.0146*** -0.0109** -0.0111** -0.0044 -0.0004 -0.0006 
    (-2.92) (-2.15) (-2.19) (-0.86) (-0.08) (-0.12) 
M&A liquidity    0.1547*** 0.1532*** 0.1526*** 0.1568*** 0.1552*** 0.1545*** 
    (12.68) (12.60) (12.56) (12.74) (12.64) (12.61) 
Herfindahl index    -0.0023 -0.0019 -0.0016 -0.0042 -0.0040 -0.0034 
    (-0.36) (-0.31) (-0.26) (-0.65) (-0.60) (-0.54) 
Year and ind. dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R² 0.041 0.046 0.046 0.073 0.075 0.076 0.079 0.082 0.082 
Observations 20,432 20,432 20,432 19,372 19,372 19,372 19,042 19,042 19,042 
Change in slope          
BB+ <= CR <=BBB–   -0.0085***   -0.0059***   -0.0064*** 
   (-4.37)   (-2.90)   (-3.08) 
BBB– < CR <= A–   0.0045**   0.0026   0.0032 
   (1.99)   (1.13)   (1.38) 
CR > A–   -0.0047***   -0.0034*   -0.0039** 
   (-2.64)   (-1.90)   (-2.16) 
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Table 4 
Credit rating levels and cash- versus stock-financed acquisitions 
  
Panel A presents models for cash-financed acquisitions and Panel B presents models for stock-financed 
acquisitions.  Columns (1) and (2) contain the marginal effects for probit specifications and columns (3) 
and (4) contain unconditional marginal effects for tobit specifications.  All models are estimated as 
piecewise regressions with three different knots. The sample consists of all U.S. listed firms with credit 
ratings over the period 1989-2011.  The dependent variable in the probit models in Panel A (Panel B) 
takes the value of 1 if the firm makes at least one cash-financed (stock-financed) acquisition in year t 
larger than 1% of the firm’s market value of equity.  The dependent variable in the tobit models in Panel 
A (Panel B) is the sum of all cash-financed (stock-financed) acquisitions exceeding 1% of market equity 
divided by total assets.  For each transaction, to determine the fraction that is cash (stock) financed, we 
multiply the deal value by the fraction of the total payment that is in cash (stock).  The control variables 
are the same as in Table 3. The explanatory variables are lagged by one year with respect to the 
dependent variable.  At the bottom of each panel, we report the change in slope from the preceding 
rating category.  All models include year and industry fixed effects, whose coefficients are suppressed 
and are based on calendar year and Fama-French 48 industry classification dummies, respectively.  The 
z-statistics reported in parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and acquirer clustering.  CR 
stands for credit rating level. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
Panel A. Cash-financed acquisitions 
 
 Probit Tobit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
CR < BB+ 0.015*** 0.009*** 0.0025*** 0.0016*** 
 (5.46) (2.66) (5.57) (2.89) 
BB+ <= CR <=BBB– -0.007 -0.008 -0.0014* -0.0012 
 (-1.43) (-1.55) (-1.86) (-1.53) 
BBB– < CR <= A– 0.006* 0.005 0.0007 0.0006 
 (1.69) (1.27) (1.30) (1.08) 
CR > A– -0.009*** -0.010*** -0.0016*** -0.0016*** 
 (-3.02) (-2.89) (-3.26) (-2.85) 
Control Variables No Yes No Yes 
Year and ind. dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R² 0.038 0.055 0.055 0.089 
Observations 20,432 19,042 20,431 19,042 
Change in slope     
BB+ <= CR <=BBB– -0.022*** -0.017** -0.0039*** -0.0029** 
 (-3.44) (-2.47) (-3.79) (-2.56) 
BBB– < CR <= A– 0.013* 0.013* 0.0021* 0.0019 
 (1.74) (1.67) (1.83) (1.57) 
CR > A– -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.0023*** -0.0022** 
 (-2.74) (-2.60) (-2.62) (-2.43) 
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Table 4 (continued) 
 
Panel B. Stock-financed acquisitions 
 
 Probit Tobit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
CR < BB+ 0.002 -0.001 0.0004 -0.0000 
 (1.02) (-0.32) (1.19) (-0.06) 
BB+ <= CR <=BBB– -0.007** -0.006** -0.0015** -0.0013* 
 (-2.24) (-1.99) (-2.13) (-1.76) 
BBB– < CR <= A– 0.004 0.002 0.0007 0.0004 
 (1.50) (0.86) (1.36) (0.66) 
CR > A– -0.005** -0.004** -0.0010** -0.0010** 
 (-2.39) (-2.08) (-2.30) (-2.01) 
Control Variables No Yes No Yes 
Year and ind. dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R² 0.053 0.082 0.065 0.106 
Observations 20,338 18,954 20,431 19,042 
Change in slope     
BB+ <= CR <=BBB– -0.008** -0.006 -0.0019** -0.0013 
 (-2.11) (-1.39) (-2.10) (-1.33) 
BBB– < CR <= A– 0.010** 0.009* 0.0022** 0.0017 
 (2.12) (1.73) (1.98) (1.48) 
CR > A– -0.008** -0.007* -0.0018** -0.0013 
 (-2.23) (-1.72) (-2.08) (-1.55) 
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Table 5 
Summary statistics on lagged upgrades and downgrades 
 
This table provides the proportion of lagged upgrades/downgrades over the previous two years by 
credit rating level.  N corresponds to the number of firm-year observations. N/A stands for not 
applicable. 
 
Rating level                          N Lagged upgrades Lagged downgrades 
AAA 315 2.22% N/A 
AA+ 112 5.36% 8.93% 
AA 395 4.05% 4.05% 
AA– 451 5.99% 10.20% 
A+ 828 7.37% 7.13% 
A 1,490 7.58% 7.32% 
A–  1,206 11.53% 11.28% 
BBB+ 1,534 11.28% 11.47% 
BBB 1,944 10.03% 11.88% 
BBB– 1,664 12.68% 12.98% 
BB+ 1,205 19.83% 12.53% 
BB 1,686 17.91% 11.03% 
BB– 2,067 14.80% 11.18% 
B+ 1,902 11.15% 12.62% 
B 1,029 10.01% 22.64% 
B– 508 9.65% 31.30% 
Rating < B– 324 7.41% 53.09% 
All ratings 18,660 11.70% 12.71% 
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Table 6 
Prior credit rating changes and acquisitiveness  
 
This table reports the effect of past rating actions on acquisition likelihood and intensity.  In the probit 
models (Panel A), the dependent variable takes the value of 1 if the firm announced at least one 
acquisition in year t exceeding 1% of the market value of its equity, and 0 otherwise.  The dependent 
variable in the tobit models (Panel B) is the sum of all acquisitions exceeding 1% of market equity 
announced by a firm in year t, divided by total assets at the end of year t–1.  The reported estimates are 
marginal effects for probit and unconditional marginal effects for tobit models.  Column (1) is based on 
the full sample, and columns (2) to (5) focus on subsamples based on credit rating levels as reported in 
the heading of the corresponding column.  The explanatory variables are lagged by one year with 
respect to the dependent variable.  Variable definitions are in the Appendix.  All specifications include all 
control variables (as in column (9) of Table 3) and year and industry fixed effects, whose coefficients are 
suppressed and are based on calendar year and Fama-French 48 industry classification dummies, 
respectively.  CR stands for credit rating level. The z-statistics reported in parentheses are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and acquirer clustering. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
Panel A: Probit models 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
All CR < BB+ 
BB+ <=CR<= 
BBB– 
BBB– 
<CR<=A– 
CR>A– 
Lagged upgrade 0.017* -0.007 0.050** 0.028 -0.014 
 (1.79) (-0.51) (2.42) (1.38) (-0.53) 
Lagged downgrade -0.066*** -0.063*** -0.049** -0.071*** -0.056*** 
 (-8.06) (-5.01) (-2.46) (-4.17) (-2.81) 
      
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R² 0.056 0.071 0.097 0.073 0.104 
Observations 17,533 6,807 2,738 4,537 3,390 
 
Panel B. Tobit models 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
All CR < BB+ 
BB+ <=CR<= 
BBB– 
BBB– 
<CR<=A– 
CR>A– 
Lagged upgrade 0.0033 -0.0026 0.0112*** 0.0052 -0.0013 
 (1.56) (-0.78) (9.60) (1.34) (-0.23) 
Lagged downgrade -0.0165*** -0.0168*** -0.0120*** -0.0161*** -0.0135*** 
 (-6.93) (-4.41) (-10.45) (-3.70) (-2.61) 
      
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R² 0.083 0.099 0.137 0.112 0.173 
Observations 17,533 6,823 2,768 4,537 3,405 
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Table 7 
The effect of credit ratings on acquirer CARs  
 
This table presents the estimates of OLS regressions of acquirer 5-day cumulative abnormal returns 
(CARs) around the acquisition announcement on credit rating levels and control variables.  The 
dependent variable is expressed as a percentage.  Columns (3) and (4) are piecewise regressions with 
three different knots. In columns (1) through (3) the sample includes only the first transaction in a given 
year, while in column (4) the sample includes all transactions.  Variable definitions are in the Appendix.  
All models include year and industry fixed effects, whose coefficients are suppressed and are based on 
calendar year and Fama-French 48 industry classification dummies, respectively.  The t-statistics 
reported in parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity.  CR stands for credit rating level. ***, ** 
and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
CR -0.161*** -0.752***   
 (-3.16) (-3.01)   
CR2  0.024**   
  (2.55)   
CR < BB+   -0.382** -0.259* 
   (-2.11) (-1.68) 
BB+ <= CR <=BBB–   -0.214 -0.074 
   (-0.97) (-0.40) 
BBB– < CR <= A–   -0.091 -0.151 
   (-0.64) (-1.29) 
CR > A–   0.048 0.018 
   (0.40) (0.17) 
Ln (Size) -0.071 -0.070 -0.063 -0.058 
 (-0.57) (-0.56) (-0.50) (-0.55) 
Relative size 2.317*** 2.298*** 2.304*** 2.158*** 
 (4.92) (4.91) (4.92) (5.11) 
Horizontal 0.054 0.043 0.046 0.146 
 (0.22) (0.17) (0.19) (0.72) 
Public -3.162*** -3.177*** -3.176*** -3.267*** 
 (-8.38) (-8.44) (-8.43) (-10.44) 
Cash 0.371 0.378 0.379 0.378* 
 (1.55) (1.58) (1.59) (1.92) 
Cross border 0.219 0.217 0.219 0.258 
 (0.75) (0.74) (0.75) (1.07) 
Tender 1.775*** 1.791*** 1.781*** 1.682*** 
 (3.28) (3.32) (3.30) (3.87) 
Hostile 0.158 0.123 0.130 0.00201 
 (0.17) (0.13) (0.14) (0.24) 
     
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R² 0.059 0.060 0.060 0.058 
Observations 3,358 3,358 3,358 4,760 
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Table 8 
Downgrades by rating category 
 
A downgrade is defined as a decline in rating over a two-year period.  The acquisition sample consists of 
firms that made at least one acquisition in year t, where the downgrade is measured over the period t-1 
to t+1.  N refers to the number of firms that have made acquisitions or have not made acquisitions.  In 
Panel A all rating categories are displayed individually; in Panels B and C rating categories are grouped in 
the same sets as employed for the piece-wise linear regression in Table 3.  Difference p-value in Panels A 
and B is the p-value of a t-test of the difference in proportions between the Acquisition and No 
Acquisition samples.  In Panel C, the p-value refers to a t-test of differences in proportions between 
various groups in the likelihood of being downgraded.  Positive (Negative) CAR Acquiring refers to 
acquirers that earned positive (negative) returns, on average, for the acquisitions completed in year t. 
 
Panel A. Downgrades by rating 
 
Credit Rating All firms Acquiring 
firms 
N Acquiring Other firms N Other Difference  
p-value 
AAA 16.35% 25.71% 35 15.19% 283 0.11 
AA+ 18.87% 31.25% 16 16.67% 90 0.17 
AA 22.39% 32.73% 55 20.71% 338 0.05 
AA– 27.21% 33.77% 77 25.87% 375 0.16 
A+ 24.58% 31.45% 159 22.95% 671 0.02 
A 21.67% 25.63% 320 20.56% 1,143 0.05 
A– 25.92% 28.98% 245 25.13% 951 0.22 
BBB+ 24.11% 25.45% 275 23.82% 1,247 0.57 
BBB 20.69% 17.62% 369 21.43% 1,535 0.10 
BBB– 18.99% 16.56% 320 19.60% 1,291 0.22 
BB+ 22.30% 19.57% 230 22.99% 909 0.26 
BB 22.19% 18.26% 334 23.24% 1,261 0.52 
BB– 21.14% 13.70% 416 23.08% 1,590 0.00 
B+ 18.36% 13.11% 366 19.67% 1,464 0.00 
B 18.30% 13.43% 134 19.09% 817 0.12 
B– 11.09% 11.11% 45 11.08% 397 0.99 
Below B– 12.29% 0.00% 17 13.24% 219 0.11 
 
Panel B. Downgrades by rating category 
Credit Rating 
Category 
All firms Acquiring 
firms 
N Acquiring Other 
firms 
N Other Difference  
p-value 
CR>A– 22.57% 28.70% 662 21.17% 2,900 0.00 
BBB–<CR<=A– 23.17% 23.17% 889 23.17% 3,733 0.99 
BB+<=CR<=BBB– 20.36% 17.82% 550 21.00% 2,200 0.10 
CR<BB+ 19.35% 14.41% 1,312 20.48% 5,748 0.00 
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Table 8 (continued) 
Panel C. Downgrades by rating category and stock price response associated with the acquisitions 
Credit Rating 
Category 
Positive 
CAR 
Acquiring 
N Positive 
CAR 
Acquiring 
Negative 
CAR 
Acquiring 
N Negative 
CAR 
Acquiring 
Other Firms N Other p-value 
difference 
positive CAR - 
negative CAR 
p-value 
difference 
positive 
CAR - other 
p-value 
difference 
negative 
CAR - other 
CR>A– 26.89% 357 30.82% 305 21.17% 2,900 0.27 0.01 0.00 
BBB–<CR<=A– 20.28% 503 26.94% 386 23.17% 3,733 0.02 0.15 0.10 
BB+<=CR<=BBB– 16.92% 331 19.18% 219 21.00% 2,200 0.50 0.09 0.53 
CR<BB+ 11.15% 771 19.04% 541 20.48% 5,748 0.00 0.00 0.43 
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Table 9 
The impact of acquisitions on rating changes 
 
This table reports the effect of M&A decisions on credit rating changes in the period surrounding the 
merger announcements.  The dependent variable in columns (1) and (3) of Panels A and B and column 
(1) of Panel C is ∆CRt–1,t+1, the rating change between year t+1 (post-treatment period) and year t–1 
(control period).  The dependent variable in columns (2) and (4) of Panels A and B, and column (2) of 
Panel C is a dummy variable set equal to one if the firm has been downgraded over the period t-1 to t+1.  
Models (1) and (3) of Panels A and B and model (1) of Panel C are estimated using OLS.  Models (2) and 
(4) of Panels A and B and model (2) of Panel C are probit models.  The main explanatory variable in 
models (1) and (2) of Panels A and B is a dummy variable set equal to one of the firm announced an 
acquisition in year t.  In model (3) of Panels A and B, we include a dummy if the firm announced 
acquisitions associated with positive CARs, on average, and a dummy if the firm announced acquisitions 
with negative CARs, on average.  In Panel C, these dummies are interacted with dummies representing 
various rating ranges as measured in year t-1.  In Panel B, p-value Pos – Neg) refers to the p-value of a 
t-test of equality of the coefficients on the positive and negative acquisitions dummies.  In Panel C, we 
report p-values of t-tests of equality of the coefficients on the positive and negative acquisition 
dummies for various rating categories.  Definitions of other variables are in the Appendix. The t-statistics 
(for OLS) and z-statistics (for probit) reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates are 
adjusted for heteroskedasticity and firm clustering. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 9 (continued) 
 
Panel A. Acquisition decision and the change in credit rating  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
 
OLS 
Rating change 
Probit 
Prob. downgrade 
OLS 
Rating change 
Probit 
Prob. downgrade 
Acquisition dummy -0.055** 0.019**   
 (-2.25) (2.05)   
Acquisition dummy pos.   -0.019 0.001 
   (-0.63) (0.08) 
Acquisition dummy neg.   -0.102*** 0.043*** 
   (-3.25) (3.31) 
ΔSize 0.850*** -0.231*** 0.849*** -0.231*** 
 (14.66) (-13.91) (14.64) (-13.87) 
ΔProfitability 2.192*** -0.745*** 2.183*** -0.741*** 
 (6.15) (-7.19) (6.12) (-7.15) 
ΔCFO 0.184 -0.053 0.187 -0.054 
 (0.82) (-0.78) (0.83) (-0.80) 
ΔCash holdings -0.122 0.044 -0.122 0.045 
 (-0.57) (0.68) (-0.57) (0.68) 
ΔInterest coverage 0.003*** -0.001*** 0.003*** -0.001*** 
 (3.80) (-3.82) (3.81) (-3.81) 
ΔMarket-to-book 0.119*** -0.030*** 0.118*** -0.030*** 
 (5.32) (-4.39) (5.30) (-4.37) 
ΔStDevRet -1.657*** 0.349*** -1.656*** 0.347*** 
 (-14.75) (12.34) (-14.73) (12.31) 
ΔLeverage -2.152*** 0.616*** -2.150*** 0.615*** 
 (-13.21) (13.11) (-13.19) (13.09) 
ΔDebt/EBITDA -0.000 -0.002* -0.000 -0.002* 
 (-0.02) (-1.88) (-0.03) (-1.85) 
ΔNeg. Debt/EBITDA 0.166 -0.147*** 0.166 -0.147*** 
 (1.33) (-4.66) (1.33) (-4.67) 
ΔConvertible 0.428* -0.140 0.430* -0.142 
 (1.73) (-1.61) (1.74) (-1.63) 
ΔSubordinated -0.062 -0.002 -0.060 -0.003 
 (-0.24) (-0.03) (-0.23) (-0.04) 
ΔVolatility -2.359*** 1.153*** -2.348*** 1.153*** 
 (-3.61) (5.70) (-3.59) (5.71) 
ΔCapex 2.759*** -0.896*** 2.757*** -0.894*** 
 (9.45) (-9.12) (9.44) (-9.10) 
ΔPPE 0.545 -0.279*** 0.542 -0.276*** 
 (1.51) (-3.84) (1.51) (-3.79) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R² 0.230 - 0.231 - 
Pseudo R² - 0.150 - 0.151 
Observations 13,493 13,493 13,493 13,493 
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Table 9 (continued) 
 
Panel B. Controlling for excess stock returns 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS 
Rating change 
Probit 
Prob. downgrade 
OLS 
Rating change 
Probit 
Prob. downgrade 
     
Acquisition dummy -0.049** 0.019**   
 (-2.00) (1.96)   
Acquisition dummy pos.   -0.013 -0.000 
   (-0.42) (-0.02) 
Acquisition dummy neg.   -0.097*** 0.043*** 
   (-3.10) (3.28) 
Excess stock return 0.130*** -0.025*** 0.129*** -0.024*** 
 (5.92) (-3.06) (5.86) (-3.00) 
     
p-value Pos – Neg)    0.00 0.00 
     
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R² 0.233 - 0.233 - 
Pseudo R² - 0.153 - 0.153 
Observations 13,403 13,403 13,403 13,403 
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Table 9 (continued) 
 
Panel C. Analysis for different rating categories  
 
 (1) (2) 
 OLS 
Rating change 
Probit 
Prob. downgrade 
   
Acquisition dummy pos. * CR>A– -0.317*** 0.063** 
 (-4.84) (2.30) 
Acquisition dummy neg. * CR>A– -0.351*** 0.082*** 
 (-5.46) (3.06) 
Acquisition dummy pos. * BBB–<CR<=A– -0.038 0.015 
 (-0.69) (0.72) 
Acquisition dummy neg. * BBB–<CR<=A– -0.207*** 0.078*** 
 (-3.98) (3.33) 
Acquisition dummy pos. * BB+<=CR<=BBB– 0.097 0.007 
 (1.55) (0.25) 
Acquisition dummy neg. * BB+<=CR<=BBB– 0.041 0.039 
 (0.46) (1.18) 
Acquisition dummy pos. * CR<BB+ 0.142*** -0.067*** 
 (3.11) (-4.04) 
Acquisition dummy neg. * CR<BB+ 0.132** -0.021 
 (2.51) (-0.94) 
Excess stock return 0.131
*** -0.025*** 
 (6.00) (-3.09) 
   
p-value Pos – Neg) * CR>A– 0.69 0.60 
p-value Pos – Neg) * BBB-<CR<=A– 0.01 0.03 
p-value Pos – Neg) * BB+<=CR<=BBB- 0.58 0.45 
p-value Pos – Neg) * CR<BB+ 0.88 0.07 
   
Control variables Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes 
Adjusted R² 0.238 - 
Pseudo R² - 0.156 
Observations 13,403 13,403 
 
 
